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Mesocosmological Descriptions: An Essay
in the Extensional Ontology of History1
Abstract
The following paper advances a new argument for the thesis that scientific and historical knowledge are
not different in type. This argument makes use of a formal ontology of history which dispenses with
generality, laws and causality. It views the past social world as composed of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian
objects: of events, ordered in ontological dependencies. Theories in history advance models of past
reality which connect—in experiment—faces of past events in complexes. The events themselves are
multi-grained so that we can connect together different faces of theirs without counterfeiting history. This
means that, on the basis of the same set of facts, historians can produce different models of past events,
in which different dependences are brought forth. A conception of this kind substantiates an objectivist
account of the recurrent falsifications of the theories in history.
   “All flesh is grass, and historians, poor things, wither more quickly than most.” —R. H. Tawney
1. Opening
This paper addresses the fact that historical theories are falsifiable at high rate: historical theories
are repeatedly revised.2 This situation is felt to be a scandal to history because historical theories
have an “existential import” by definition. Indeed, their objective is to tell exactly what happened,
i.e., what was, in the past. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that despite this prima facie
unreliability of historical knowledge, it is objective in principle.
Further, the paper advances a new argument against the autonomy of historical knowledge.3 The old
argument, to remind the reader, was set out in Karl Popper’s and Carl Hempel’s view that
knowledge in a historical study is not different in type from knowledge in a study of nature. Of
course, there is a major difference between history and natural sciences. This, however, is a
difference in their justification, not in the type of their knowledge. The difference in question arises
mainly because the laws of history are laws of particular events and thus are of high complexity,
whereas the laws of science are general and, because of this, are much simpler.
In particular, I strongly oppose Popper-Hempel’s “covering law model of history” and suggest an
alternative scientific philosophy of historical knowledge. To be more specific, I develop a scientific
treatment of history, following, what I shall call now, the “ontology of mesocosmology”. It views
the social world as a mesocosm,4 which is situated between the microcosm of the private world of
the individual person, and the macrocosm of the geographical and, even further, of the astronomic
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world.5 These three cosmoses, however, are built up in one and the same way. That is why the
academic disciplines which study them are not different in type.
My next claim is that the events both of the past and in the historical theories are ordered one to
another in ontological dependence, thus resulting in complex wholes out of which the historical
mesocosm is made. In particular, the models supplied by a theory of history order historical facts
and events so that the theory makes the form of every event experimentally touch another event. By
this ordering, some facts are made to depend on each other ontologically. Apparently, here we have
not causation or implication but colligation: touching, overlapping, permeating and comprising of
events.
2. Mesocosmological Ontology
To elaborate on this understanding, I follow a particular interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.6
It accepts that the world consists of objects (facts, events, states of affairs) which are stuffy or
voluminous individuals. The objects have borders, or faces, which are in contact with the faces of
other objects. Being voluminous, they fill up the world. The complex objects (cluster of events, of
states of affairs) are arranged by way of connecting the objects’ forms (faces). It is of importance to
note that what makes the objects stick together is the very docking (colligating) of their faces—this
is what secures the cohesion between them. There is no third, connecting element between them, no
copula, no external relations, no “mortar”.
From an ontological perspective, the events with their forms are parts of the sum of all possible
configurations in which they can occur; in other words, the forms of the events are the possibilities
of events’ occurring in any imaginable cluster of events.7 We can even postulate that there is one
overall comprehensive construction of elementary possibilities, situated in the logical (as different
from geometrical) space: the block-universe of all possible worlds, in which all implicit
configurations are folded up one into another. Metaphorically, we can present all possible events as
logically folded polyhedrons, the faces of which are their forms.8 The block-universe of all possible
states of affairs is one massive cluster of such folded up polyhedrons, the faces of every one of
which touch the faces of other polyhedron-object.
There are two ways in which the possibilities of this block-universe can be actualized and so can
produce actual events and structures:
(1) They can construct actual facts of nature. To this I would like to add the following comment:
following Wittgenstein, I understand the real world as the tip of the iceberg of the all
concatenations of possible forms of events. This tip is what is actualized out of the pool of all
possible forms now, at this moment. In it, some possible forms are cooled down to actual
configurations of states of affairs. A change in the real world occurs when a new configuration,
constructed out of possible forms of objects, is actually produced.
(2) Such actualization can be also produced by knowing individuals. Indeed, scientists, historians
included, construct in their theories new, imaginary states of affairs (models)9 which either agree
with reality, or they do not.10
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3. Constructing Historical Theory
Here is this conception as applied to history:
According to the social ontology I argue for in this paper, the “surface of the social life”11 is an
aggregate of events which can be seen as solid, stuffy pieces (planks, chunks). Understood this way,
social events can be treated as Tractarian objects which are connected to one another as explained in
§2. In particular, every possible social object, including large-scaled events, for example, the
outbreak of the World War I, can be presented as a solid polyhedron which has, practically,
innumerably many faces. These faces have in them a myriad possible connections with the faces of
innumerably other facts of the social history; i.e. the connection of World War I to (i) imperialism,
(ii) nationalism, (iii) socialist movements of the time, etc. Some of them were actualized; others
remained potential.
My deep (in contrast to surface) social ontology follows an assumption which was best expressed in
L.N. Tolstoy’s claim that once the agent is involved in relationships with other agents, she is no
longer free but is a part of an inexorable stream of the “complexity of life.”12 “[The agents] are part
of a larger scheme of things than we can understand. We cannot describe it in the way in which
external objects or the characters of other people can be described, by isolating them somewhat
from the historical ‘flow’ in which they have their being.”13 We cannot present the social world
from outside as if it were one object among others.
This means that attempts to outline the “real causes” of human actions in the past are doomed to
failure from the beginning. The complexity of human life is endless so that the historian can only
describe, or “explain”, a small part of it. Tolstoy’s conclusion was that “no theory can possibly fit
the immense variety of possible human behavior, the vast multiplicity of minute, undiscoverable
causes and effects.”14 I add to this: the most we can hope for in history is to advance illuminating
models of some past events, explaining them only partially.
To be more specific, when historians investigate past social events and further advance a historical
theory (tell a story) about them, they experimentally put a piece (chunk) of social reality, i.e. a past
event, next to other past events and set them in a relation of ontological dependence, thus
constructing a historical model (a theory). In this way historians do a quasi thought-experiment with
past events. They do not make inferences: indeed, inferences are made only in logic. Inferences are
necessary—we are compelled to do them. In contrast, we make theories in history voluntary,
following our intuitions. We arrange the past facts in patterns, as for experiment, in order to model
historical events.
Especially important is that historians can also connect the facts as they were never connected in the
past in exactly this formation; nevertheless, this connection (theory) could be most illuminating.15
This can be explained by referring to the quasi Leibnizian “pre-established harmony” between
actual and potential events (states of affairs) of the block-universe, 16 so that even if we bring
together elements which never met in practice, they can fit together exactly.
This conception provides support for the following picture of historical knowledge. We
experimentally rearrange past events in ever new ways, putting them next to facts we have learned
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recently. Thus, a historical fact which occurred in, say, 1850, can be investigated from new
perspective, for example, from the perspective of the new feminism, of environmental ethics, of the
racism/antiracism debate, etc. Seeing it from one of these new perspectives, we usually believe that
this historical fact was “caused” by events about which we had previously been either ignorant, or
which we simply hadn’t noticed despite the fact that we knew them. Of course, this conception does
not mean that there is no past—rather, it claims that we can find in the past events faces that can be
put together to faces of certain recent high profile events. That is why we can contemplate past
events from the point of view of today.
This is exactly how history was advanced in the last two centuries or so.17 Ever new perspectives in
investigating past events18 were opened, allowing for fresh examinations of the old events. It is
worth noticing here that, on the one hand, most of these new perspectives are objective,19 in the
sense that they refer to real faces of real facts which occurred in the past. On the other hand,
however, they are also subjective, in the sense that any of these theories (or visions)—i.e.
experimentally constructed large-scale state of affairs—exists only in our head.
Let us recapitulate our conception of history as developed so far. The subject-matter of history as
an academic discipline is the description of parts of the stream (the course) of the events in past
social life. A theory of history puts the faces of different past events next to one another, showing
them in ontological dependence. In this way, it constructs, as in an experiment, theories, to be more
precise—hypotheses about how things “really happened” in the past. I also claim that when rightly
done, this approach helps us to see the past facts with the eyes of their producers—the agents of
history.
But how is the arrangement of individuals in the model done? Following the thesis of
mesocosmological ontology, I accept that historical individuals (events, facts) are voluminous
things which fill up the “logical space” of history. In this sense, we can see them as having the form
of polyhedrons with many facets. Being such, they obey the laws of mereology and topology: The
polyhedron of this particular historical fact / event can, for example, comprise (include) the
polyhedron of another fact either in part, or in full. Furthermore, these polyhedrons can permeate
one another, they can cover one another—wholly or in part,—they can slide over one another, etc.
Here all topological variations are possible.
The mereo-topological ontology of history suggested in this paper accepts that when advancing a
new theory in history, the historicists as it were play—experiment—with historical individuals,
constructing new models of past events out of them. In such cases the events under scrutiny can be
put in all possible extensive (geometrical, topological, mereological) relations: they can wander
inside and outside the individuals who are seen as comprising them, etc.
Of course, historians are engaged in such “playful” practices in the good faith to deliver a most
“realistic” (“truthful”) picture of the world. They believe that their task is to make mimetic models
of reality which second the past events (exactly like Wittgenstein’s models in the Paris court!). This
is not surprising since, as already noted, not only do historians’ advance theories, they also claim
that the theories they advance are true.
Furthermore, both historians and their audience judge different theories in history as true/false
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exactly on the grounds of whether they cohere with the past reality or not. This procedure of
verification helps to correct and improve models. Our ability to judge this way, however, does not
mean that we know what exactly happened in the past. In other words, it does not disprove the
agnostic claim with respect to what really happened in the past made in the beginning of this
section—indeed, we can judge the rightness of this or that picture of the past without being in a
position to analyze it.20
4. Criticism of the Concept of Causation in History—Perspectivism
Historians, both oral and academic, are prone to speak about causes in history. Fortunately,
philosophers have already shown how suspect this concept is.21 One of the most convincing
criticisms of causality was brought up by Gilbert Ryle in his The Concept of Mind. Ryle’s claim
was that what scientists really establish in cases of supposed causality are laws which provide
“inference-tickets” that are used when reasoning on that matter—and nothing more.22 Nobody
knows how exactly one event has “caused” another one.23 Especially misleading is to assume that
cause is something third between two events. In philosophy of history, Ryle’s argument was
adopted by William Dray in his work Laws and Explanation in History.24 In particular, Dray
insisted that historical agents act for reasons—their actions are not just “caused”.
The conception of historical explanation advocated in this paper dispenses with the notion of
causation in a way which differs from that of Ryle and Dray. I agree with these authors that what
are asserted in history are dependencies of facts, actions, reasons, etc. However, the problem is to
specify the nature of these dependencies which can be of different kinds. They can be intensional,
by which the explanans completely determine the explanandum in the sense that the first quasi
logically entails the second; or they can be extensional, in particular, ontological (mereological, or
mereo-topological), with only a conditional dependence between them. In this paper I plead for
extensional dependences in history. More precisely, I claim that historical events, both of past
reality and of historical theories, are simply ordered one to another in ontological dependence, thus
resulting in complex wholes out of which the historical mesocosm is made.
Furthermore, the models supplied by a theory of history organize—in the form of descriptions—
historical facts and events so that the theory makes the form of every event experimentally touch
another event. There is no third link (usually called cause, which Ryle criticized, or law, which
Ryle didn’t criticize) between them. By this ordering, some facts are made to depend on each other
ontologically. Apparently, here we have not causation or implication but colligation: touching,
overlapping, permeating and comprising of individuals (events). The very topological relation
determines the ontological dependence. That is why, instead of speaking of causation in history, I
prefer to talk about occasioning, or of conditioning, or of originating in history.
This conception of philosophy of history is close to what is known as “perspectivism” in
philosophy of history. Perspectivism has two main variants.25 One of the most convincing forms of
perspectivism, set out in W.H. Walsh’s Introduction to Philosophy of History, claims that whereas
scientific study is objective,26 historical study is of necessity made from a point of view, from a
perspective, which is connected with certain particular moral and metaphysical assumptions. Value-
judgments play a leading role in historical study.
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Now, despite Walsh’s insistence that different points of view do not contradict one another—they
are just distinct facets, or aspects, of the truth,—his reference to the value-judgments in historical
studies gives to the latter a rather subjective coloring.27 Karl Popper, in particular, used to claim
that different points of view in history are incommensurable, so they cannot be testified, in
particular, cannot be refuted. Consequently, they are not theories: they are subjective visions.28
In contrast to Walsh’s perspectivism, the perspectivism embraced in this paper is thoroughly
objective. It claims that correct points of view in historical theory29 simply describe different,
objective chunks of reality—different events of the social past which we now investigate. To be
more precise, various perspectives produce different arrangements (chains) of these objective
individuals, putting them in different ontological dependencies.
This variant of perspectivism is inspired by a Wittgensteinian Theory of Conceptual Shifts. The
theory in question was developed on the basis of the Tractarian ontology and of the aspect-changing
epistemology of Philosophical Investigations. Unfortunately, since Wittgenstein put enormous stress
on the primacy of language, the authentic ontology and epistemology of the Theory of Conceptual
Shifts are very difficult to reconstruct and articulate. They were developed in full only by two
followers of Wittgenstein’s: Friedrich Waismann and John Wisdom, as well as by the pupil of
Wisdom, Renford Bambrough. Unlike Wittgenstein, these three philosophers put the problem of
how we produce and understand language in brackets.
According to John Wisdom, for example, the task of philosophy is to introduce new ways of seeing
things. Most often, a new perspective discloses something which is already known to us; however,
it puts it into a new pattern of connections.30 In fact, it does not convey new information but new
apprehension, which is both illuminating and truth-relevant. This procedure requires a sound
judgment, or what Descartes once has called bona mens: a judgment which rejects all irrelevant
connections of facts in order to pick out only the most illuminating ones (for the present purpose).
Following this understanding, I shall reset the task of the mesocosmological ontology of history as
making conceptual shifts. History does this in two ways: First, it produces descriptions which are
nothing but seeing well-known events in a new way. This is what makes their cognitive point.31 A
good example here is the way Eric Hobsbawm saw European history from 1914–1991: as Age of
Extremes; and again as The Short Twentieth Century.32 Secondly, we can look for new facts in
order to produce a new perspective which would help to see past events in a new way.
It is often claimed that conceptual shifts present contingent pictures which are neither true nor
false.33 To the contemporary deconstructivists, in particular, every point of view is contingent and
subjective.34 In contrast, I insist—referring to the mesocosmological ontology as elaborated in §2—
that the products of the conceptual shifts are objective and truth-relevant.35
The task of the technique of conceptual shifts is to discover and outline a “new physiognomy”.
Such a technique was used, for example, in Oswald Spengler’s examination of patterns, or making
Gestalt-analyses of historical events set up in his Decline of the West.36 Unfortunately, Spengler’s
analyses were speculative to the extreme. Wittgenstein admired Spengler's book but advanced his
own Gestalt-analyses method in philosophy (including in philosophy of mathematics), which is
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more down to earth. He also noted that the realm of history is especially appropriate for such
analyses. It is this method that this paper follows.
5. Theory of Colligations, Against the Covering-Law Model of History
From a logical point of view, the topological relation of comprising of two past events can also be
seen as a relation of implying: we can see the comprising element as implying the comprised. That
is why comprising plays the central role in our mesocosmological ontology. Its importance results
from the fact that exactly this relation substantiates deduction in history, on the basis of which we
are inclined to speak about “causes” and “effects” in it. Further, In every particular historical
theory, the quasi general—in fact, comprising—historical event is only docked to (it colligates to)
some of the facets of the comprised event; they do not fuse one into another. This, in turn, means
that the comprised events are independent from the comprising event—despite the fact that we
present them, in our experiment, in a relation of dependency. An example: The killing of the
Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo in 1914 can be seen as comprising—i.e. “causing”—the outbreak
of the World War One. However, the connection between the two events is not necessary—in fact,
they can exist independently from one another. That is why we can consistently suggest another
cause of the World War One.
The standard argument against conceptions of this kind is that they cannot discern between social
“causation” and accidental regularities such as “the cat is on the mat.” From here the conclusion is
made that to describe is not to explain; explaining is something more than (over and above)
describing. Against this argument, I would like to set out that mesocosmological colligations
historians make are not merely series’ of events but ones with an asymmetric relation of ontological
dependence between them.43 In fact, the models they construct are based on such dependencies. To
take the same example: Some historicist puts the outbreak of the World War One in ontological
dependence from the killing of the Austrian crown prince.
Every new model in history defines which facts are important for a particular investigation and
which are not so important;44 and also which facts occasion other facts. However, the
mesocosmological analysis made in this paper claims that this ontological dependence is to be
accepted only as if, for the purpose of this modeling. In truth, the individuals of these dependences
remain autonomous (atomic) units and thus are free for new, alternative arrangements. Needless to
say, every historian sincerely believes that what he/she suggests is the absolute truth about how past
events really happened. They are serious about what they claim; indeed, this feeling is a
presupposition of their theoretical work.
One of the implications of this conception of history is that a historical study cannot suggest valid
general or universal laws. This also means that the covering law model of history is mistaken. The
covering law model of history, to remind the reader, was introduced by Max Weber and was further
elaborated by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel. It claims that explanation in history is achieved
exactly like it is achieved in science: by subsuming what is to be explained under a general law. It
is a deduction of events: (1) from antecedent conditions; (2) from relevant laws (in form of points of
view). Popper, in particular, claimed: “To give a causal explanation of a certain event means to
derive deductively a statement which describes that event, using as premises of the deduction some
universal laws.”45 The difference is that while sciences usually establish universal laws, historians
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advance general laws. The logical form of the procedure, however, is the same.
My objection to this conception of Popper–Hempel echoes Wittgenstein’s (neo-Humean) claim
from the Tractatus, 6.3–6.33, that there can not be logical dependence between physical events.
This is even more so in history which, as Popper had correctly noted, is a science of the particular.
The acceptance that historical explanations reveal logical dependencies between events leads to
illusions, in particular to the illusion that theories in history explain entities.46
The mesocosmological philosophy of history, in contrast, claims, first, that by explaining a
historical event the historian takes an individual a which, in a topological sense, is more
voluminous than another individual b. Then the historian sees a as comprising b: for example, the
“assassination of the Austrian-Hungarian crown prince in Sarajevo” as comprising “the outbreak of
World War I,” and so as ontologically implying it.
Here it is another example of this conception: The acceptance that the event of
(1) The German National Socialist Party coming to power in Germany in 1933
was due to
(2) The social peculiarities of Germany in the approximately 130 years preceding 193347
sees (1) as following from (2). The very possibility of this thesis, however, is based on two events
known rather independently from this judgment. We know event (1), and we know the horizon of
events in which it can be docked to (which we can make to follow from) it. Now, one of these
events is (2); this specific thesis of history colligates the two. This colligation of events, however,
doesn’t substantiate a relation of causal dependence. Rather, the two events are set in an ontological
dependence, and all this only in experiment. The experiment—the new historical theory—is
performed with the purpose to articulate the “sense” of the past event,48 i.e. to say exactly what
happened in the past.
Here I would like to remind the reader that the theory of colligations was introduced in philosophy
of history by W.H. Walsh, with reference to William Whewell. According to Walsh, historians use
“the procedure of explaining an event by tracing its intrinsic relations to other events and locating it
in its historical context.”49 To this purpose, the historian chooses some important ideas which serve
as a principle for colligating events. In this way the historian “aims to make a coherent whole out of
the events he studies.”50 Up to this moment, Walsh’s philosophy of history is in agreement with
our mesocosmological ontology. Similarly to Walsh, my historicists chooses important events as
comprising others. The difference between the two theories is that Walsh’s philosophy of history is
not a theory “of the ultimate moving forces of history.”51 That is why he advised historians to use
plenty of other explanations as well; general principles, causal explanations, etc.
The mesocosmological philosophy of history laid out in this paper claims that such explanations
too can be discussed in terms of collocations. For this purpose, it uses the term “colligation” in a
wider sense. History not only seeks to connect the large-scale event under scrutiny with relevant
(related) facts which came in contact with it in the past (or which simply could have come in
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contact with it in the past); it also explains this event in terms of these facts, putting it and them in
well-formed description (models).
6. History and the Sciences
In §4 I criticized the view that historical knowledge is subjective. Here I shall examine the claim
that the ever new perspectives from which historians see political, social and intellectual facts of the
past are autonomous and thus incommensurable. I disagree with this argument and argue that
different perspectives in history have a common ground—the real past events which, despite multi-
faced and so complex,37 have fixed (invariant), and objective parameters. These real past events
guarantee the communication between different perspectives in history, in particular, succession
between them.
The succession of accepted real past events which we put in ever new perspectives of history
explains, in turn, how progress in academic history is made: by making use of ever new past facts
in historical study, putting them into ever new connections. The aptitude for progress, incidentally,
is another fact which supports the relatedness of history to science. Indeed, “the point [of history] is
not merely [to set out] one new perspective next to another. Its point is [to receive] better, richer
knowledge; to correct, revise, or enlarge the knowledge we had thus far.”38
The progress of historical knowledge is a matter of fact. To be sure, only an extravagant mind
would claim that our knowledge of, say, the Great French Revolution 1789–1795 had not improved
in the last hundred years or so. Consider also the progress in our knowledge of the German history,
comparing Johannes Haller’s Die Epochen der deutschen Geschichte39 with the standard Ulf
Dirlmeier et al., Kleine deutsche Geschichte.40 The difference between them is like the difference
between our knowledge of the Moon’s geology in 1923 and in 1995.
Another argument for accepting that history is a science is that technically, it develops as any other
science does: in academic historical journals new theories are presented as new discoveries which
aim at refuting, or correcting, the old ones. They are examined through referring to facts,
documents and authority. This is exactly how biology, physics and chemistry develop.
Some authors claim that what makes history different from science is that “[history] is made out of
actions, of their collective intricacy; [and we are to] view human behavior not only in its reactive
aspects [as we do in science], but also under the aspect of being purposive, calculated, planned.”41
When we do this, we do not look for causes or subsume the actions under a single law. That is why,
so goes this argument from free will, history will never become a science.
For philosophy of history based on mesocosmological ontology, however, the fact that history is
made of actions based on free will is not a hindrance to considering it a science. Truly, the laws of
this science are extensive, not intensive, as are the laws of physics, for example. That is why we
scarcely find general truths in it. Extensive are, however, also the laws of some other sciences. So
climate-changes are contingent. This fact notwithstanding, there is such a science as meteorology
which produces weather-forecast maps of this or that moment, at this or that place. Similarly,
history produces patterns (Gestalten) which can help orient ourselves in the past events.
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The mesocosmological ontology of history also conceives historical study as similar to the science
of geography. This is the case because both disciplines describe extensive chunks of reality, and so
perform cognate tasks: recognition of one—the right—relevant pattern (Gestalt), out of many
possible ones, and its articulation (expression).42 Further, both disciplines present extensive entities
in a concise (encoded) form. The main difference between them is that, whereas geography presents
in this way spatial objects, history presents in this way temporally situated events, or clusters of
events.
These considerations suggest that our conception of historical studies can be validly illustrated
through the practice of geographical study. One example: You can produce a map of London from
quite different perspectives. You can make London photography from the air, or you can produce a
map of London’s restaurants, or a map of London’s sporting venues, etc. Now, all these pictures
and maps are different perspectives of the town, every one of which reveals different faces of it.
This also means that the perspectives in question are objective and so do not contradict or refute
one another. The same can be said about the history put in terms of the mesocosmological ontology.
It shows how it is possible to interpret one and the same cluster of past events differently, without
some of these interpretations being necessarily contradictory.
7. By Way of Epilogue: Our Conception of History
and Some Recent Developments in It
In this last section I would like to demonstrate that the extensional and realistic ontology of
historical study, suggested in this paper, is also in agreement with the developments in history in
the last eighty years.
Similarly to many other philosophical disciplines, philosophy of history of the late nineteenth
century was revolutionary in intention. This revolution was connected, above all, with the name of
the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey who, in the 1880s, embraced a program which had as an
ideal the most rapidly progressing discipline of the time: psychology. Above all, Dilthey insisted
that the objects of science and history are qualitatively different. In particular, he claimed that the
subject-matter of history, as well as of other humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), is human life, and
that the stream of human life consists of experiences which have meaning and value. In contrast, the
subject-matter of science is the “brute facts” which do not refer to these two concepts.
The point is that “we relate to life, both our own and that of the other persons, with
understanding.”52 That is why human studies should use an idiosyncratic method: the method of
empathy towards the actors on the historical stage. Scholars, who follow this method, try to reach
the mental content—the idea, the feeling—manifested in the historical facts; to enter—in a thought
experiment—the mind of the historical agent.53 A remote follower of Dilthey, R. G. Collingwood,
said later: “History did not mean knowing what events followed what. It meant getting inside other
people’s heads, looking at their situation through their eyes, and thinking for yourself whether the
way in which they tackled it was the right way.”54 In other words, the task of the historian is to
discover and reconstruct the thoughts and intentions (the mental contents) of the agents on the
historical stage—and this is a rather intricate task.
By way of commentary on this point, I would like to note that programs like that of Dilthey–
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Collingwood were reactions to the domination of the idealistic philosophy of history (of Hegel, in
particular) set out by scholars like Leopold von Ranke and J. G. Droysen, which placed an emphasis
on seeking “general truths” (laws) in history. The philosophy of history of Dilthey–Collingwood
can be seen as an attempt to substantiate a new method in this discipline which reveals new layers
of past events. Unfortunately, Dilthey and Collingwood used for this purpose methods of another
discipline—that of psychology, which eventually turned out to be unsatisfactory for history.
A really new history was born only when a new, objective method was introduced in it. Here I have
in mind above all the movement set out by some French historians, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre
among them, grouped around the journal Annales, which was started in 1929. This nouvelle histoire
movement didn’t focus on political events of the past only; and when it does, then not only on the
big structures which shape them—governments, wars, states,—but also on the “little” past facts of
la vie quotidienne. Besides political events, it also investigated geographical structures, economic
conjunctures and small-scaled social groups. Typically, it places an accent on investigating the
mentality of the agents in history and on their worldview.
The manifesto of the nouvelle histoire group is considered to be Marc Bloch’s book Les Rois
thaumaturges.55 In contrast to the grand narratives of the conventional history in the hey-day of the
nineteenth century, which had the ambition of tracking down the “true panorama” of the respective
epoch, Bloch’s history started as an investigation of a small-scale fact: of the fact that the French
Royalty of the eleventh century legitimated their power through an alleged ability to magically cure
their subjects. In an attempt to explain this fact, Bloch produced a fresh reconstruction of the social
order in France of this period. His new picture of the past was based not only on analyzing the
economic, juristic, or military power of the ruling class, but also on investigating the manipulation
of the convictions and beliefs of the subjects by the royals.
The effect of this new approach to history can be summarized as a radical widening of the subject-
matter of the discipline by the opening of new layers and levels in it, thereby disclosing new chunks
of past life.56 It was in this way that history as academic discipline was revolutionized—not by
following Dilthey’s project for empathizing history, but by doing piecemeal investigations of well-
known periods of social history, and revealing fresh perspectives in it. The dream of a general passe
partout to the specific historical themes was abandoned in favor of an extensive investigation of
real historical objects, of a different caliber and level.
I hope this paper has shown that these new developments in history can be best clarified in terms of
the extensive, mesocosmological ontology of history laid out in it. Indeed, this kind of ontology
substantiated a wide variety of ontological levels (past events, clusters of events) which deserve
academic study. That is exactly what the nouvelle histoire school did.
Nikolay Milkov
University of Pittsburgh
NOTES
1. A first version of this paper was discussed at the Visiting Fellows Colloquium at the Center for
Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. I would like to thank Gabriele De Anna, Carla
Fehr, Malcolm Forster, Lilly Gurova, John Norton, Athanasios Raftopoulos and Wang Wei for the
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helpful comments.
2. Cf. the motto to this paper.
3. New arguments for the scientific character of history are to be also found in Tucker 2004.
4. The term mesocosm as denoting the social world was recently introduced by Barry Smith as “the
ecological niche of the living creature man.” (Smith 1998, p. 527)
5. Similar intuition is also expressed in Popper 1957, p. 137. Popper, however, speaks only of
microcosm and macrocosm.
6. See Wittgenstein 1922. This interpretation was developed in Milkov 1999, 2001, 2002.
7. This conception can be put in Wittgenstein’s Tractarian terms so: “If a thing can occur in a state
of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.” (2.012)
8. See Milkov 2002.
9. About science as making models see Morgan and Morrison 1999.
10. A paradigm example of such construction is the model made in a Paris court which depicted a
car-accident which suggested to Wittgenstein his picture theory of language. Hence, it is not a
surprise that natural languages can be seen in the same way: its sentences can be seen as models
which can be compared with reality, thus being rendered true or false. (See Milkov 2001)
11. A term suggested in Schatzki 1996. It came to pick out what is independent from the deep-
levelled, value-laden parts of social life which can scarcely be a subject of academic inquiry.
12. A concept also used by the later Wittgenstein.
13. Berlin 1978, p. 74.
14. Ibid., p. 35.
15. This is so not only in history. In science too we regularly advance theories which do not deliver
the facts as they really occur; these theories, however, are often most illuminating. (Cf. Cartwright
1983)
16. To paraphrase Wittgenstein (as quoted in n. 7), this pre-established harmony is, in turn, based
on the assumption that “if a social event can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of
affairs must be written into the event itself.”
17. In § 7 I shall relate the philosophy of history presented in this paper to the developments in
history in the last 80 years.
18. Including mental events, i.e. events of agents’ mentality.
19. Of course, not all of them are objective—some perspectives are simply false; that is, they are
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based on badly done investigations or conjectures.
20. This point is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 4.002: “Man possesses the capacity of
constructing languages, in which every sense can be ex-pressed, without having an idea how and
what each word means—just as one speaks without knowing how the single sounds are produced. 
Colloquial language is a part of the human organism and is not less complicated than it. From
it it is humanly impossible to gather immediately the logical of language.”
21. See for example Norton 2003.
22. See Ryle 1949, pp. 117 f..
23. In fact, Ryle’s claim here is a variant of causal agnosticism, which we already discussed in the
form it was expressed by L. N. Tolstoy in § 3.
24. According to Dray, the historian does not speak about causes. He only "says that from the set of
factors specified, a result of this kind could reasonably be predicted.” (Dray 1957, p. 39)
25. William Dray lists six variants of perspectivism (see Dray 1989, pp. 66–71).
26. See Walsh 1951, p. 95.
27. The German neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert advanced more then hundred years ago the “principle
of value-referring”, according to which while natural sciences aim at articulating general laws,
historical investigations refer to values. (See Rickert 1899, p. 85) Rickert’s conclusion was that this
explains why humanities "are believed to be subjective" and so radically different from natural
sciences.
28. See Popper 1957, pp. 150 f.
29. The predicate “correct” signals points of view which do not rest on facts which are false.
30. See Wisdom 1953, pp. 112 ff.
31. According to Norman Graebner, too, the conceptual revisions in history took place “less by
calling upon hitherto unknown or unconsidered evidence than by reinterpreting what he takes
virtually all historians of the period and most of their readers to know.” (Dray, p. 93)
32. See Hobsbawm 1995.
33. We have already mentioned that Popper had a similar view.
34. Some of them refer—misleadingly—to Wittgenstein for support of this point. See e.g. Lyotard
1984.
35. For a similar view see Bambrough 1978.
36. See Spengler 1918–22.
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37. As described in §3.
38. Nipperdey 1986, p. 276.
39. See Haller 1923.
40. See Dirlmeier 1995.
41. Bubner 1984, pp. 160–1, see also p. 158. This argument, in fact, repeats the already discussed
(in §4) point of William Dray that the agents act for reasons.
42. See Milkov 2006.
43. On ontological dependence see Lowe 2005.
44. The fact that “the cat is on the mat” will surely not fall into the spotlight of whichever historian
and so would not be accepted as determining other historical facts.
45. Popper 1952, ii, p. 262.
46. White 1963, p. 4.
47. A thesis developed in Wehler 1987–95.
48. I use “sense” here in Frege’s sense.
49. Walsh 1951, p. 59.
50. Ibid., p. 61.
51. Ibid., p. 62.
52. Dilthey 1910, p. 196.
53. In more recent times, this conception was revived by Edward Said (see Said 1978), which
complained the lack of understanding of historical events and agents, demonstrated by the Western
scholars of the Middle East.
54. Collingwood 1944, p. 43.
55. See Bloch 1924.
56. See Campbell, p. 190.
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